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10.1  Introduction 
Most economists using a standard life-cycle analysis would probably 
agree that the primary objective of  a pension system is  to provide a 
standard of living in retirement comparable to that enjoyed during the 
working years. Nevertheless, there is considerable disagreement on how 
that objective can best be achieved. Broadly, the disagreements are on 
the appropriate roles for private pension plans and a public pension plan 
in the pension system and on whether or not the pension system should 
also be used for redistribution or transfers. The most elegant approach to 
the problem  would  undoubtedly  be  to solve  for  the optimal overall 
pension system with a simultaneous determination of the optimal forms 
for both public and private parts. However, the analysis here is more 
limited in its scope because its focus is principally on the public part of the 
system and because it examines only one of the many possible functions 
that such a system might serve in any real-world implementation. That is, 
the sole intent of the system is assumed to be the retirement objective and 
not, for example, also to redistribute wealth. This chapter should thus be 
viewed as only a prologue to a more complete functional analysis of  the 
overall pension system, including the important issue of  the degree of 
integration between private and public pension plans. 
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Analysis of  the public part of  the system is a natural starting place 
because, whatever form the overall pension system takes, it will surely 
include a significant public pension plan component. As I shall discuss, 
there are a number of theoretical arguments to support such a component 
as part of an optimal system. Moreover, as a practical matter indepen- 
dent of any theoretical welfare arguments that economists might provide 
to the contrary, the public pension system in the United States, after 
almosl half a century of  operating experience, is not going to be elimi- 
nated, especially when  a significant  fraction of  the population  is not 
covered by any private pension plan. The current problems with social 
security do, however, present the possibility for major changes in the 
structure of  the public pension  system. It would therefore seem to be 
somewhat difficult to analyze the optimal design of private pension plans 
and the associated issue of integration until the structure of  the public 
system is more firmly established. 
In theory, the characteristic differences between a public and a private 
pension system are that participation in a public system is mandatory and 
that the public system cannot be “custom tailored” to meet the specific 
preferences of each individual participant. Such a clear distinction is valid 
if the private system were solely laissez-faire individual saving. However, 
as the private system has evolved, the operational significance of  this 
distinction, at least at the level of analysis presented here, is less clear. 
Participation in most existing private pension plans is virtually manda- 
tory. In a typical defined-contribution plan, individual choice of amounts 
contributed and where the funds are invested  is quite limited, and in 
defined-benefit plans there is typically no choice at all. Therefore, the 
analysis presented here  in  the context  of  a public  system  is  readily 
adaptable to an organized private pension system. 
The arguments for a public pension system with mandatory participa- 
tion fall into two basic categories: externalities and private market fail- 
ure. An important example of  the former is the utility externality that 
other people’s welfare is one of the arguments of individual utility func- 
tions. That is, people care about others and, among other things, will not 
let them starve in retirement. From this, we get a classical example of the 
free-rider problem, which cannot be solved by the private markets but 
can be solved by an appropriately designed mandatory public pension 
system. A  second example is  the possibility  of  economies of  scale in 
information costs. Virtually everyone faces the decision of how much to 
save for retirement and where to invest those savings during the working 
years. The marginal cost of  obtaining the education and gathering the 
necessary data to make informed decisions, as well as the time spent 
implementing these decisions, will vary substantially across individuals as 
a function of  their prior  education  and their  wealth.  (Presumably,  a 
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cost  than  a professor  of  physics.)  The cost  of  buying the service of 
informed decisions will be lower (as a percentage of  wealth) for those 
who are wealthy than for those of modest means. While such costs could 
be reduced by pooling, this solution almost assumes away the problem 
because pooling requires adequate information and opportunity to form 
a cohesive group. 
If, therefore, a pension plan were designed which reasonably approxi- 
mated the plan which most individuals would choose if  they were in- 
formed, then by making participation  in the plan  mandatory  the re- 
sources used in individual education and data gathering would be saved 
and the maximum benefits of  pooling to reduce operating costs could be 
achieved. The benefits of such mandatory participation must, of course, 
be compared to the cost in terms of loss in individual freedom of choice. 
As already noted, existing private pension plans permit  little choice. 
Although this data point favors the hypothesis that the benefits outweigh 
the costs, it is hardly a sufficient basis for a policy decision. 
The second basic category of arguments for a public pension plan is 
that the efficiency of  risk bearing can be improved. That is, the govern- 
ment can provide diversification possibilities which are not available in 
the private markets and thereby issue financial instruments, which the 
private  sector  cannot. One example would  be intergenerational  risk 
sharing, which cannot be covered by private markets (see Fischer 1982). 
Another would be to use either taxes and transfers (see Merton 1981) or 
taxes and the issue of  securities within the pension system to provide 
diversification of some of the risks of assets which are not tradable (as is 
the case for much of human capital). 
With these general reasons for a public pension plan as background, I 
shall summarize  briefly  the consumption  indexed plan  to be  studied 
before turning to a formal analysis in the context of a simple intertempo- 
ral equilibrium model in section 10.2. In section 10.3, I discuss the merits 
and feasibility of  such plans. 
The plan  is a mandatory fully funded  savings plan  of  the defined- 
contribution type wherein required contributions by each member of  the 
plan  are a fixed  proportion of  that member’s  consumption.  As with 
current private  defined-contribution plans, each member has an indi- 
vidual account which is credited with his contributions (less any deduc- 
tion for operating expenses of  the plan). 
Contributions and earnings in each member’s account are invested in 
aggregate per capita consumption indexed life annuities, defined to be an 
instrument that pays a constant fraction of aggregate per capita consump- 
tion to  its holder (the member) each period, such payments beginning at a 
prespecified date (the date at which the member begins to receive his 
benefits)  and continuing  until  the member dies. If  the member dies 
before the commencement date, the annuity is worthless. Benefits, there- 262  Robert C. Merton 
fore, are in the form of a life annuity indexed to aggregate per capita 
consumption. 
The commencement date for benefits is at a specifiied age (e.g., age 
60), whether or not the recipient has retired. This provision is to avoid 
possibly undesirable distortions of the decision to retire. However, provi- 
sion could be made for delaying the receipt of  benefits to a later age. 
Contributions are mandatory from some statutory beginning age (e.g., 
age 21) until the commencement date. 
One way to administer such a plan would be to  create a public corpora- 
tion which would be responsible for issuing the indexed life annuities to 
plan members where these annuities would constitute its senior liabilities. 
The United States government would be the residual liability or equity 
holder of the corporation and would have unlimited liability. The assets 
of the corporation would come from member contributions and be in- 
vested in the broadest available portfolio of marketable securities. 
The number of  units of  life annuities issued  to an account is on a 
“mark-to-market’’ basis at the time each contribution is received. That is, 
the value of a unit of  a life annuity issued is determined by current market 
prices and mortality tables. To make this possible, it would be necessary 
for the government to issue aggregate per capita consumption indexed 
bonds of various maturities. 
To prevent  attempts to circumvent  mandatory  participation  ir, the 
plan, retirement benefits are assumed to be neither assignable nor attach- 
able. For similar reasons, integration of  private pension plans with the 
public  plan  are permitted, but only to the extent that the combined 
benefits received by the individual are no less than he would have re- 
ceived from the public plan alone. 
10.2  A Simple Intertemporal Equilibrium Model 
In this section, a continuous-time consumption choice model of  the 
type presented by Merton (1971, 1973) is used to analyze the system of 
mandatory saving and consumption linked retirement benefits. 
Consider an economy where all people have the same lifetime utility of 
consumption which is given for a person born at time to by 
where c(t;  T)  is consumption at time t of a person of  age T and E,  is the 
conditional expectation  operator conditional on knowing all relevant 
information available at time t. Each person has an uncertain lifetime 
where? denotes the random variable age of death, and the probability 263  On Consumption Indexed Public Pension Plans 
that the person will die between T and T + dT,  conditional on being alive at 
age T,  is given by  X(T)dT where  A(T)  >O.  Each individual acts so as to 
maximize (1) subject to his initial wealth wo. 
If the event of death is independent of  other economic variables, then, 
along the lines of the proof of Theorem VI in Merton (1971, p. 400), we 
can rewrite (1) as 
where f(7;T’)  is the probability that the person will be alive at age T 
conditional on being alive at age T’.  By the definition of  A(T),  fsatisfies 
(3)  ~(T;T’)  = exp [ - 1  h(s/dr]  . 
By assumption, individuals have no bequest function. Hence it will be 
optimal for each person to enter into a life annuity contract wherein his 
wealth goes to the issuer if  he dies and he receives a payment if  he lives. 
One such arrangement would be a series of short-term contracts wherein 
at age T  the individual agrees to bequeath his wealth, w(t;  T),  to the issuer 
if he dies between T and T  +  dT  and the issuer agrees to pay him a dividend 
D * dt  if he lives. If there are enough people in the economy to diversify 
away completely the risk of  individual deaths, and if the contracts (like 
futures contracts)  require no side payments  between issuer  and pur- 
chaser, then the competitive equilibrium dividend will be h(T)w(t;T)dt. 
In addition to the annuity contract, the person will choose an optimal 
portfolio allocation of  his wealth. As shown, for example, in Merton 
(1971), the fractions of  his optimal portfolio allocated to the available 
investments  are independent of  his wealth  or age  because  his  utility 
function is of the isoelastic form. Therefore, all investors in the economy 
will hold identical portfolios (except for scale). Hence, without loss of 
generality, I assume that all people invest in a single security. The rate of 
return on this security, dMIM, is assumed to follow an It8 process given 
by 
(4) 
--  dM -  adt + udz, 
M 
where the instantaneous  expected rate of return a  and the instantaneous 
variance of  the return u2  are constants over time. It follows from (4) that 
the return on this security is  lognormally distributed.  Moreover, as a 
necessary  condition  for equilibrium,  this  security must  be  a  market 
portfolio (i.e., a portfolio which contains all available investments and 
holds them in proportion to their market values). 264  Robert C. Merton 
The accumulation equation for the wealth of a person of age T at time t 
can therefore be written as 
(5a) 
if  he does not die between t and t + dt and as 
dw(t;  T)  = {[h(~)  + a]w(t;~)  -  c(f;T)}dt  + crw(t;.r)dz 
(5b)  dw(t;T) = -  W(f;T) 
if  he dies between t and t + dt. 
Along the lines of the derivation in Merton (1971, p. 390), the optimal 
consumption demand for a person of  age T  at time t can be written as 
(64  C (  f;  T)  =  U(T)  W (f  ;  T)  , 
where a(.)  is a solution to the differential equation 
with p =  (p -  ya)/(l  -  y) + ycr2/2. By inspection, optimal consumption 
is a function of  both wealth and age, and the marginal propensity to 
consume (out of wealth) will be an increasing function of  age if L(T)  2  0. 
Similarly, the distribution of a person’s wealth who is alive at time t + s, 
given his wealth at time t,  will depend, not only on his wealth at time t and 
the return experience on his portfolio between t and t + s, but also on his 
age at time t. 
Using ItB’s lemma, we have from (6) that 
(7) 
dc(t;T) -  dw(t;T)  A(T)  + -  dt. 
C(f;T)  W(f;T)  U(T) 
Conditional  on the person  not  dying  between  t  and  dt, we  have  by 
substitution from (5)  and (6) that (7) can be rewritten as 
and, of course, if  he dies then dc(t;.r)/c(t;.r)  = -  1. By inspection of (8), 
the dynamic path of a person’s optimal lifetime consumption follows a 
Markov process independent of  either his wealth or his age (except for 
the “stopping point”). That is, given his consumption at time t,  c(t;T),  his 
consumption (if alive) at time t +  s  has a lognormal distribution which can 
be represented by 
(9)  c(t  +  S;T +  s) = c(t;-r)exp[(a -  1.1s  + (TV‘~E], 
where E is a standard normal random variable. Thus, unlike the percent- 
age change in wealth, which is age dependent, the percentage change in 
consumption is the same for all people alive. It follows, therefore, that 265  On Consumption Indexed Public Pension Plans 
for all people alive at time t +  s and T,T' 2  0. 
Armed with (8) and (lo), we can now proceed to derive the dynamic 
properties of aggregate per capita consumption, C(t).  If L(~;T)  denotes 
the number of  people of  age T  in the economy at time t,  then the total 
population size, L(t),  equals  JT L(t;  T)~T.  Therefore, aggregate per capita 
consumption is equal to 
C(t)  =  L(t;~)c(t;~)d~/L(t)  i  0 
If the birthrate at time t is given by b(t),  then the change in aggregate per 
capita consumption is given by 
dC(t) =  L(t;~)dc(t;~)d~/L(t)  -  H(t)C(t)dt, 
(12)  i  0 
whereH(t)z{b(t)[C(t) -  C(t;O)] -  JTh(T)L(t;T)[C(t)  -  C(t;T)]  dT/L(t)}/ 
C(t)  * 
The properties of  H(t) are, of  course, dependent on demographic 
assumptions. However, they also depend on the distribution of consump- 
tion per capita. If, for example, the distribution of per capita consump- 
tion were uniform-that  is, c(~;T)  = C(t),  for all 7-then  H(t)  = 0, inde- 
pendent of demographics. In a stable population [b(t)  =  S;h(T)L(t;T)dT/ 
L(t)],  H(t) = -  S~A(T)L(~;T)  [c(t;O)  -  c(~;T)]  dd[  L(t)C(t)],  and thesign 
of H will depend primarily on the distribution of per capita consumption 
between the very young and the very old, where the marginal death rate, 
X(T),  is largest. If that distribution is approximately equal-c(t;O)  == c(~;T) 
for large .r-and  the population is growing, then the sign of H(t)  will equal 
the sign of  [C(t)  -  c(t;O)],  the difference between the general population 
per capita consumption and per capita consumption of  the very young. 
Even without taking into account the interaction between population 
growth and economic conditions, the analysis of stochastic demographic 
models is formidable. And, while the death rate (at least in the short run) 
may be exogenous, the birthrate is surely affected by economic condi- 
tions. Therefore,  although explicit consideration of the process for H(t)  is 
important for many issues in this paper, no such analysis will be under- 
taken here. Instead, I simply postulate that H(t)  = 0.' 
If H(t)  = 0, then we have by  substitution from (8) that (12) can be 
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= (a  -  p)C(t)dt + aC(t)dz. 
A comparison of  (8) with (13) shows that, except for scale, each person's 
optimal consumption follows a stochastic process identical to the one for 
aggregate per capita consumption. That is, conditional on being alive at 
time t + dt,  ~c(~;T)/c(~;T)  = dC(t)/C(t),  independent  of the person's age T. 
Therefore, we have for person j that his consumption (if he is alive) at 
time t can be written as 
(14)  c,(t) = P,C(t), 
where P,  =  c(t,;O)/C(r,)  and t, is his birthdate. 
Consider now a mandatory savings and retirement plan where, begin- 
ning at age To,  each person must contribute at rate 6 times his consump- 
tion until, at age TI,  the person begins to receive his life annuity retire- 
ment benefits. During the accumulation period of  length T, = TI -  To, 
each person's contribution is invested in a per capita aggregate consump- 
tion linked life annuity contract matched to his age at the time of  the 
contribution. 
Let A(~,T;  T,) denote the equilibrium price at time t of  a life annuity 
contract which begins its payments at age TI  and the purchaser is cur- 
rently age T. The promised stream of payments is equal to C(s)  per unit of 
time from time s = t + 7',  -  T until the purchaser dies. Let P(~;T)  denote 
the equilibrium price at time t of  a consumption linked pure discount 
bond of  maturity  T  which  pays  $C(t  + T) at time t + T. If,  as I  have 
assumed, individual death risk can be diversified away, then the competi- 
tive equilibrium price for A can be written as 
-r 
where, as previously defined, ~(T;T')  is the probability of being alive at 
age T conditional on being alive at age 7'. 
For the economy of this section, an explicit formula for the P(~;T)  can 
be derived  by  competitive  arbitrage. From (13), C(t  +  T) = C(t) exp 
[(a  -  p + 1/2a2)7  + aJ:+'dz(s)].  Therefore, the realized return on the 
discount bond between t and t +  T  is C(t + T)/P(~;T)  = C(t)e-pT/P(t;~) 
exp [(a  -  1/2a2)7  + ~J:+~dz(s)].  However, from  (4),  the return per 
dollar from investing in the market portfolio between t and t +  T is exp 
[(a  -  112~')~  + uJ:"dz(s)].  Therefore, to avoid arbitrage, P(~;T)  must 
satisfy 
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It follows from (16) that the instantaneous rate of return on the bond, 
dPIP = udt + adz, is the same as on the market. Substituting for P from 
(16), we can rewrite (15) as 
Moreover, it is straightforward to show that, for T <  TI, 
-_  dA -  [a  + X(~)]dt  + adz 
A 
if  the owner of the contract is alive at t + dt and dAIA = -  1  if the owner 
dies between t and t + dt. 
Let V(t;  T)  denote the value of the accumulated retirement account for 
a person of  age T  at time t. Under this retirement plan, with accumula- 
tions in  units of  a consumption-linked life annuity, the value  can be 
expressed as 
(19)  V(t;T)  = N(.r)A(t,T; Tl), 
where N(T)  equals the number of units accumulated at age T. By ItB’s 
lemma, dV = N(T)dA + N(7)Adt  if  the person  lives to time t + dt and 
dV= -  V if  he dies between c and t + dt. Under the mandatory saving 
plan, lii(T)A(t,T;T1) = 6c(t;T)  and N(TO)  = 0. From (14), c(~;T)  = pC(t), 
and if  the retirement plan is designed to provide fraction q  (0 <  T I  1) of 
the person’s optimal retirement period consumption, then 6 should be 
chosen so that at retirement the number of units accumulated, N(  T,), 
equals qp. 
If the retirement plan is fully funded and actuarially fair, then at age To 
the present value of the person’s future contributions should be equal to 
the present value of the annuity payments to be received during retire- 
ment. Under the terms of  the mandatory  saving plan, the person will 
contribute at the rate 6c(t;T)  = spC(t) (as long as he is alive) until he 
reaches TI.  Therefore, at age To,  the present value of his future contribu- 
tions, F(t;  To),  is given by 
F(t;  To)  = 
T1-  To 
f(s  + To;  T,)[GpP(r;s)]ds 
(20)  s  0 
j:  0 
= Sp  f(s  + To;  To)P(c;  s)ds . 
If the plan is to provide N(T,)  = qp units in retirement, then the present 
value of these retirement benefits at age To  is qpA(t; To;  TI).  Therefore, 6 268  Robert C. Merton 
must be chosen such that F(t;  To)  = qpA(t, To;  TI), and from (15) and 
(20) we have that 
Substituting for P from (16), we can rewrite (21) as 
By inspection of (22), the required contribution fraction does not depend 
on endowments or the individual contributor’s age. It does, of  course, 
depend on the statutory retirement age, TI;  the accumulation period, 7,; 
and the target fraction of retirement period consumption provided by the 
plan, -q.  Therefore, S can be kept constant over time and still meet the 
objectives of the plan. The only changes required would be in response to 
large cumulative changes in the mortality tables,for p,  and these would 
probably be infrequent. Moreover, because the plan is fully funded and 
accumulations earn a fair market return, such changes infor p as might 
occur will cause no significant distortions even if S were not adjusted over 
time. 
To provide a crude estimate of the magnitude of 6,  I assume (1) that thc 
accumulation  period  T, = 45  years;  (2) that during the accumulation 
period the mortality rate is a constant, h,  equal to .0138 per year; and (3) 
that during the retirement period the mortality rate is a constant, h,  equal 
to .0666 per year and in no event will anyone live longer than 30 years 
after retirement. The average rate of growth of aggregate per capita real 
consumption from  1947 to 1981 is approximately 2% per year. If  the 
expected real rate of return on all wealth in the economy, a,  is taken to be 
4%, then from (13) we derive an estimate for p, of 2%. Substituting these 
numbers into (22), we have that 
(23)  s = .10-q. 
That is,  to provide  for all of  retirement consumption  (q = 1) would 
require about 10% contribution rate. While such a rate may seem large 
(requiring contributions of  the order of  $200 billion in 19Sl), 10% is a 
common contribution rate (on income) in many existing private defined- 
contribution  plans,  and  the  current maximum  contribution  rate  for 
Keogh plans is 15%. To provide further perspective, I would also note 
that the combined employee-employer contributions to social security in 
the fourth quarter of  1981 were at an annual rate of $245 billion. It is, of 
course, unlikely that a public pension plan would be expected to provide 
for all retirement consumption, and therefore the necessary contribution 
rate would be considerably less than 10%. 269  On Consumption Indexed Public Pension Plans 
10.3  On the Merits and Feasibility of a 
Consumption Indexed Public Plan 
While the analysis in the previous section demonstrates a consumption 
indexed public retirement plan, it is presented within the context of a 
model where such plans are redundant. That is, with perfect markets for 
both assets and annuities, no utility externalities, and rational and in- 
formed people, there is no need for such public intervention. From this 
base, however,  imperfections can be introduced  to provide at least  a 
qualitative  analysis of  the benefits  of  the plan  for  comparison  with 
alternative  plans  if,  and  when,  such  intervention  were  deemed  ap- 
propriate. 
For example, a significant feature of  this plan is that contributions be 
invested  in  aggregate consumption  linked life annuities.  If  important 
assets within the economy, such as human capital and real estate, are 
either nontradable or not available in divisible lots, then even a broad- 
based portfolio of tradable assets will not provide a fully efficient diver- 
sified portfolio.  However, an individual’s consumption is likely to be 
strongly correlated with his wealth (or permanent income) whether that 
wealth is tradable or not, and therefore a security whose return is per- 
fectly correlated with aggregate per capita consumption is likely to repre- 
sent a better diversified holding than a portfolio containing only market- 
able securities. Moreover, even when all securities are traded, Breeden 
(1979) has shown that all efficient portfolios will be perfectly correlated 
with aggregate consumption. 
If there are systematic differences among large segments of the popula- 
tion as to the types of  nontradable assets they hold, then it is possible to 
improve diversification efficiency still further. For example, the young in 
the economy may be forced to hold too large a fraction of  their wealth in 
human capital because it is not tradable while the old hold too small a 
fraction in human capital because they cannot buy it. As I have shown 
elsewhere (1981), risk bearing can be improved by a system that taxes 
wages and pays wage linked retirement benefits. However, as that analy- 
sis amply demonstrates, such further diversification gains are earned at 
the expense of having a pay-as-you-go retirement system with a risk of 
significant distortions from the associated taxes and transfers. 
Diamond (1977) has suggested that one reason for a social security 
system is the absence in  the private markets of  “real” or “indexed” 
investments by which people of normal means can accumulate savings for 
retirement. However, “real” fixed-income bonds  would  only protect 
such savers against the uncertainties of inflation. They would not protect 
the saver against the risk of real increases in the standard of  living. As 
shown in table 10.1, real per capita consumption in the United States has 
increased  at an average  rate of  1.96% per year  from 1947 to 1981. 270  Robert C. Merton 
Table 10.1  Levels and Growth Rates of U.S. Aggregate Real Consumption 
and Over-Age-16 Population, 1947-81 
Aggregate  Per Capita 
Consumption  Population  Consumption 
(Billions/1972 $)  (Millions)  (Thousandsll972  $) 
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Source: Consumption  data are taken from U.S. Department of  Commerce, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, National income and product accounts of the United States, table 1.2. 
Noninstitutional population 16 and over data are from U.S.  Department of Labor, Bureau 
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Moreover, the annual standard deviation of  that growth rate is 1.68%. 
Hence, if  a person’s sense of economic well-being depends not only on 
the absolute level of  his consumption but also on  its level relative to those 
around him, then the risk in utility terms of a price level linked invest- 
ment can be  considerable, especially over a long accumulation period. A 
consumption linked investment protects against both inflation and real 
changes in the standard of living. It has the further practical advantage of 
avoiding the index problem because it is not necessary to distinguish 
between nominal and real changes. 
In another context, Fischer (1982) argues that the government should 
issue bonds linked to wage income. While it is likely that such bonds 
would be a superior to price level linked bonds for most saving plans, at 
least in theory, they may not be as efficient as consumption linked bonds. 
One reason is that changes in wage income capture the returns to only 
one segment (albeit an important one) of  national wealth, while con- 
sumption changes depend on all segments. A second reason is that wage 
income is more likely to have a significant transient component than is 
consumption since, by the life-cycle hypothesis, consumption depends on 
permanent income or wealth. How important the difference would be 
between wage income and consumption linked bonds is, of course, an 
empirical matter, and one that warrants further study. 
There are relatively limited opportunities  in existing private markets to 
accumulate savings in life annuities, and none where those savings are 
invested  in  consumption  linked  investments.  In the absence  of  such 
instruments,  the individual may be forced to save too much relative to his 
bequest motive. By investing contributions in life annuities, the proposed 
plan permits a person to accumulate adequate amounts for retirement 
with  smaller  contributions.  The additional  available  funds from this 
reduced contribution rate can be used either for more current consump- 
tion or to purchase life insurance or other saving instruments to meet 
bequest motives.  This feature is especially important in  a mandatory 
saving plan because, for the same target level of  retirement benefits, it 
reduces the welfare loss of the plan to those in poor health or those who 
have no bequest motive. 
A second significant feature of the plan is that retirement benefits are 
linked to aggregate per capita consumption. The arguments in favor of 
consumption linked benefits are essentially the same as those given for 
consumption linked accumulations. So, for example, while a number of 
people, including Diamond (1977), have argued for real or price indexed 
fixed annuities for retirement benefits, per capita consumption linked 
benefits are likely to dominate such annuities because they protect the 
retiree against both uncertainties in the inflation rate and changes in the 
standard of  living. 
The  success of  a consumption indexed plan (whether public or  private) 
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linked  bonds. In their  absence, administrators  of  the  plan  would be 
required to estimate the fair market value  of  such bonds in  order to 
determine how many units to credit to each account during the accumula- 
tion period and to determine how much to pay in benefits during retire- 
ment. I  need hardly mention  the extreme difficulties associated  with 
making these appraisals, especially when such instruments have never 
traded. Moreover, for a public plan, there would likely be times when 
strong political pressure would be brought to bear on the administrators 
to “adjust” their appraisals. Even if  such pressure were in fact resisted, 
the mere prospect of a potential conflict of interest could taint the entire 
system. 
In theory, the private  sector  could  create a market for per capita 
aggregate consumption linked bonds and provide consumption linked life 
annuities through financial  intermediaries.  Indeed, some might  argue 
that the fact  that such  instruments  have  not  been  created is  strong 
evidence in  favor  of  the hypothesis  that there is  no need for  them. 
However, if  this hypothesis is  correct, then close surrogates for these 
instruments must already exist in the market, since-as  suggested, for 
example, by  Breeden’s  (1979)  analysis-there  is  a strong theoretical 
foundation for the belief that an aggregate consumption linked security 
would be widely demanded. I know of  no such combination of available 
securities. 
There is, of  course, the alternative hypothesis that the nonexistence of 
such instruments is an example of private market “failure.” That is, even 
though there would be a demand for these instruments, there is insuf- 
ficient incentive for investment bankers, for example, to undertake the 
costs of educating both purchasers and issuers, especially when the latter 
have no assets that are naturally matched to this type of  liability. Simi- 
larly, in the absence of  a “thick” market for consumption linked bonds, 
financial intermediaries probably would be reluctant to issue such annuity 
liabilities because there is no asset which can be purchased to  hedge these 
liabilities. Of course, some intermediaries might be induced to take some 
limited amount of  risk without being hedged, but this limited amount 
would surely be inadequate for the scale required for pension plans. On 
the other hand, it appears that the government is a “natural” intermedi- 
ary to issue consumption linked bonds because it has the power to tax 
expenditures. That is, the government could institute a consumption tax 
proportional to the number of  consumption linked bonds outstanding 
and the revenues from the tax would exactly match the required liability 
payments. Moreover, there appears to be no significant social cost to the 
government’s issuing consumption linked bonds, and there may be social 
benefits from the government’s financing the deficit in this form.*  While 
the principal reason for discussing the creation of  such bonds here is their 
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plans, consumption linked bonds would be an ideal investment instru- 
ment for private  saving generally. If  this belief  is correct,  and if  the 
government did issue such bonds, then it is likely that private financial 
intermediaries would introduce consumption linked annuities and cor- 
porations would issue consumption linked liabilities. The existence of 
such private sector financial instruments would serve to make consump- 
tion  indexed pension plans more efficient by  providing better pricing 
information for the plans’ annuities and a broader base of  securities in 
which to invest the plans’ assets. 
Even if the private sector could efficiently provide consumption linked 
bonds and life annuities, as I noted in my introduction, private pension 
plans alone cannot handle either information cost or  utility externalities. 
While it is difficult to measure how other people’s welfare enters into an 
individual’s utility function, I believe that it is likely to  do so in a relative 
fashion. That is, we are less inclined to worry about or  make transfers to 
those who have a relatively high standard of living. Among those with the 
same current standard of  living, we are more sympathetic toward those 
who have fallen on “hard times” and experienced a decline from their 
past standard. If  this assessment is correct, then a public plan along the 
lines discussed here appears to efficiently handle this utility externality 
for people in retirement. By requiring individuals to make contributions 
proportional to their consumption during their working years and invest- 
ing these contributions in per capita consumption linked life annuities, 
the plan ensures an accumulated amount sufficient to support a retire- 
ment consumption path for individuals at a level (relative to aggregate 
per capita consumption) similar to that which they enjoyed during the 
working phase  of  their  life.  Linking  benefits to per capita  aggregate 
consumption  provides  for  a  continuation  of  their standard of  living 
throughout the retirement years. Thus, a plan with these features meets 
the objective of  ensuring an appropriate relative standard of  living in 
retirement for everyone and it also handles the free-rider problem. 
These features do not, of course, solve the redistribution problem for 
those whose relative standard of living is too low during their working 
years.  However, a reasonable  argument can be made that it is more 
efficient to make the necessary transfers by other, more direct means at 
the time when they are needed (during the working years) instead of 
attempting to do  so indirectly by redistributing future benefits within the 
retirement plan. There are other good economic arguments for keeping 
the transfer system and the retirement system separate, but that is not the 
focus of  this paper. I would note, however, that the plan analyzed here 
would automatically handle much of the redistribution problem for peo- 
ple in their retirement years if a proper transfer system were devised for 
people during their working years.  Transfers received  and consumed 
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portionately  because  the required contributions  to the plan  are pro- 
portional to consumption. Transfers in the form of a total or partial credit 
for the individual’s required contribution to his retirement account would 
work in a similar fashion, provided that the cost of  this transfer is not 
borne by the retirement plan itself. 
Having reviewed the merits of a consumption indexed pension plan, I 
now turn to the issue of  its feasibility. Although the idea of  investing 
accumulations in  consumption  linked life  annuities is  new,  the basic 
structure of the plan is simple and is essentially the same as a standard 
defined contribution pension plan. It is therefore a relatively easy plan to 
explain and understand. Its format also has the attraction of  stability in 
the sense  that neither its  basic  structure nor  the parameters of  the 
structure (such as the contribution rate or the period of  accumulation) 
would require much change over time, even in the face of  significant 
variations in  economic conditions.  It does, however,  require that an 
appropriate measure for aggregate per capita consumption be ~hosen.~ 
To select the proper measure would require further study to determine 
how consumer durable purchases should be treated and whether or  not to 
include items such as leisure time which are not normally included in 
measures of  consumption.  There is also the issue of  what  population 
measure to use. While investigation of these issues is beyond the scope of 
this chapter, their resolution is not an insurmountable problem. With this 
measurement problem solved, there does not appear to be any major 
difficulty with the government’s issuing consumption linked bonds and 
using  their prices  to determine the value  of  consumption  linked  life 
annuities. 
The main feasibility problems with a public plan as described here are 
likely to be associated with the method of  collecting the required con- 
tributions and the maintenance of the individual accumulation accounts. 
Though I have not investigated in detail the amount of computation and 
record keeping required in the current social security system, it appears 
likely  that the amount required for  individual  account  maintenance 
would not be significantly larger for a consumption linked plan. How- 
ever, the collection in such a plan would probably be more difficult than 
for current social security because the base is consumption rather than 
income. As outlined, the plan requires that the amount of each contribu- 
tion be indentifiable in the same way that individual federal income tax 
payments are identified. Therefore, the method of collection necessary 
for  its implementation would probably be like that of the income tax, with 
consumption determined as the residual from a cash flow analysis. The 
feasibility of such a collection system is currently a topic of  considerable 
discussion among economists, principally in the context of the feasibility 
of an individual expenditure tax (see Aaron and Boskin 1980; Pechman 
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I would note that there is an important difference between an expendi- 
ture tax and the mandatory contribution part of a fully funded retirement 
plan. Because it is a defined-contribution plan and accumulations earn a 
competitive rate, cheating is less of  a problem to the extent that people 
treat contributions  as saving and not  as a tax. Indeed, the rich, high- 
income, and well-informed people who might be thought to have the 
greatest incentive and opportunity  to  cheat on a tax are probably the most 
likely to view such contributions as saving, since these are the people who 
now voluntarily enter into deferred compensation and Keogh plans. In 
general, those who cheat on contributions are primarily cheating them- 
selves. However, one slight modification which might make the collection 
part of  the plan more effective would  be to have withholding of  the 
required contribution based on income, as is currently the practice for 
social security, and then to have refunds  or additional contributions 
based on the computation of consumption made in conjunction with the 
filing of  federal income tax returns. 
A more radical modification of the plan described here was suggested 
to me by Lester Thurow. The collections for the plan would be done at 
the aggregate level by a value-added tax. The aggregate amount collected 
would then be distributed as contributions to individual accumulation 
accounts in proportion to the amount of  income reported on the indi- 
vidual’s federal tax return. The administrative benefits of  this modifica- 
tion depend on the relative costs of collection for a value-added tax versus 
a residual cash flow computation on the income tax return. It does have 
the attractive feature that those who cheat by underreporting income on 
their federal tax will lose some of  their retirement benefits (which they 
presumably paid for through  the value-added tax). The principal  dis- 
advantage  of this modification is that the aggregate contributions will now 
be treated  as a consumption  tax, which  can  distort the labor leisure 
decision. However, the credit to individual retirement accounts based on 
income will  act  as a subsidy to wage  income,  which  may  offset this 
distortion at least in part.3  This modification would become considerably 
more attractive if  the government chooses to use a value-added tax to 
finance general government expenditures. 
In summary, although the method of collecting contributions poses the 
principal feasibility problem for such a public plan, a number of different 
methods would seem to serve as close substitutes provided that it remains 
essentially a defined-contribution plan which earns  a fair rate of return on 
accumulations and pays benefits indexed to consumption. 
If  a policy decision were made to adopt a public pension plan with a 
basic structure like the one analyzed here, there would still be the further 
critical policy decision of what fraction of retirement period consumption 
should  be the target for  the plan.  Presumably,  those  who  are most 
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utility  externalities would advocate a high fraction and those who are 
most concerned about preserving individual choice would advocate a low 
fraction. The correct policy decision will surely depend on the amount of 
other retirement saving that people are likely to make, especially in 
housing and private pension plans. The resolution of  this policy issue, 
therefore, requires an analysis of the overall pension system. Since that 
was the note on which I began, it seems an appropriate place for me to 
end. 
Notes 
1. On the matter of  the assumed stability of  H(t),  I note that because c(t; 0) depends 
strongly on the initial endowments of the very young, c(t;  O)lC(t)  is likely to be larger when 
the  value of  human  capital relative  to other factors of  wealth  is  larger. It also seems 
reasonable that the birthrate will be higher when the relative economic value of children is 
high. However, if  c(t;  O)/C(t)  <  1, then comparative statistics reveal that these two effects 
work in opposite directions on H(t)  in a stabilizing fashion. 
2. Fischer (1982) discusses a number of  social benefits from the government’s issuing 
wage income linked  bonds, including possible intergenerational  risk sharing that private 
markets cannot provide. Many of  the same benefits would come from consumption linkcd 
bonds,  and indeed. if  a consumption  tax  is  less distorting than a wage  tax, then  the 
consumption linked bonds may be superior. 
3.  It is, of course, not true that every model of lifetime consumption choice will lead to 
an efficient allocation of  retirement  consumption which depends only on aggregate per 
capita consumption. For example, Breeden’s (1979) important theorems on this matter will 
not apply if utility of consumption is state dependent. 
4. As I have shown elscwhere (Merton 1981), the distortion of the labor-leisure decision 
of  a consumption tax can be offset by  linking future retirement  bcnefits to current wage 
income. 
Comment  Paul A. Samuelson 
Not long ago social security was judged to be the most valuable legacy of 
the New Deal. Now social security is supposed to be in crisis, and people 
are worried whether they will receive in the end the retirement benefits 
promised to them. But what does the crisis consist of? Is it the case that 
taxpayers have reached some ceiling on their ability to  finance the sched- 
uled out-payments? No. Many nations tax themselves much more than 
we do. And, properly measured, America’s affluence is still the greatest 
of any country on earth. 
The crisis consists merely in the unresolved  debate on how rapidly 
payroll tax rates should be raised and on whether or not general revenue 
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sources should be utilized to cover part of  social security expenditures.  At 
the deeper philosophical and class-struggle level, the debate is over how 
redistributive between affluent and poor the public retirement program 
should be. As a result of recent inflation and certain inadvertent techni- 
calities of  indexing, during the 1970s older Americans  were  given  a 
step-up in their share of the total social pie. Since this result was never 
explicitly deliberated and decided on by the electorate, now that the size 
of  the social pie has ceased to grow and in view of the present conserva- 
tive resurgence it is natural that there are second thoughts about the 
generosity of  the social security program. 
What is happening in the realm of social security is of course much the 
same political struggle that is going on in general fiscal policy.’ Deficits of 
over $100 billion  are in no sense consequences of  ceilings on taxable 
capacity.  Conservatives whose central goal is to reduce the weight of 
government expenditure in the gross national product are not irrational 
to believe that the ploy of starving the government for tax revenue will in 
the end force liberal acquiescence in cutting down on transfer and public 
goods expenditure. The ploy is not irrational, but it is a form of  Russian 
roulette. Contriving or countenancing crises is a tactic that must run the 
risk that you will go over the abyss before you force the opposition’s 
capitulation short of  the brink itself. 
Robert Merton’s valuable mechanism of a consumption indexed public 
pension plan sidesteps most of  these controversial aspects. Although he 
abjures consideration of  redistributive social security for the most part, 
his mechanism could  adapt to it. He takes for granted full  actuarial 
funding, something which would have to be taken for granted by any 
voluntary private pension insurance scheme but which has to be argued 
out in any social contract with respect to mandatory social insurance. In 
an epoch when most social contracts are hardly worth the paper they are 
written on, full funding has the virtue that reneging on promises is least 
likely to be politically feasible. 
To obviate argument with those whose major preoccupation is with the 
Pareto optimality that perfect markets might achieve, Merton bases his 
case for a public system on “market failure.” In particular, he has in mind 
the many reasons why there are not perfect Arrow-contingent markets 
for each person’s human capital. If you are not able to spread the risks to 
which your earning power is intrinsically subject onto existing human 
capital markets, then even the zealots who concentrate on Pareto opti- 
mality concede  that laissez-faire will lead to deadweight loss that might be 
ameliorated by various mandatory public schemes. 
Avoiding the esoteric ItB-Wiener calculus of instantaneous probabili- 
ties, we can understand Merton’s results by contemplating a minimally 
simple model. Each of  us works in two periods of  life, youth and prime 
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working period we all earn much the same zero-variance wage. As a 
result of what each of us is then and of what we each do by way of training, 
there is a stochastic spread of our prime period’s earnings. But it is not 
possible  to actuarially borrow on our different human capitals, for a 
variety of  reasons having to do with market imperfections and incom- 
pletenesses.  (As one example there is the familiar problem  of  moral 
hazard: if an  insurance company had lent on  my brilliant prospects when I 
was a Harvard Junior Fellow, I might later have refused to write my 
successful textbook out of  the knowledge that the insurance company 
would  be cashing in  on the harvest of  my  efforts; therefore, so the 
argument goes, I had too little to spend when young and was unable to lay 
off some of  the risks of not writing a best-seller by investing some of  my 
capitalized prospects in a broad index of common stocks, bonds, and real 
property.) 
Aside from the interpersonal stochastic variations in relative earning 
power, this simplest model will presumably want to postulate that socie- 
ty’s  aggregates of  consumption  and capital  formation  are subject  to 
stochastic variation both in totals and in sectoral parts. As the quasi rents 
of capital goods fluctuate  stochastically,  the capitalized values  of  the 
securities denoting  their ownership will likewise fluctuate, with only some 
of the dispersions being capable of being diversified away. The resulting 
overlapping-generations three-period model might be called a Samuel- 
son-Diamond-Merton, or S-D-M, model in consequence of the series of 
papers (Samuelson 1958,1967,1968,1975a, 1975b, 1976,1979;  Diamond 
1965, 1977; Merton 1971, 1975, 1981, 1982). 
Some questions suggest themselves. 
1. Why does an S-D-M model lead to consumption indexed pension 
insurance contracts? We must read Merton’s lines closely to understand 
why. 
2.  Robert Merton makes skillful use of constant relative risk aversion 
utilities on the part of  the people in his system. Maximizing functionals 
that are sums of  independent period utilities, each of which are the same 
power  of  the period’s  consumption,  is  known  to lead  to nice  linear 
simplifications.  Suppose  life  utility = ~(c,)  +  (1 + R)~’  u(c,) + 
(1 + R)  -2 U(  C,),  where U(  C)  is log C or Cy  with 1  >  y = 0. Then optimal 
consumption  and wealth decisions at each stage of  life are known to 
involve simple proportionalities. With instantaneous Wiener probabili- 
ties, the constancy of  relative risk aversion can be dispensed with. 
How robust is this simplifying paradigm? I ask not to record doubt but 
to applaud Merton’s statement that his chapter is “only a prologue to a 
more complete functional analysis of  the overall pension system.” 
*** 
Rather than linger on the analytical complexities of  Robert Merton’s 
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conference reactions to his proposal. Then, finally, I can usefully elabo- 
rate on two of  the points made there: the reservations that must be made 
to the notion that real people have consistent  life-long intertemporal 
preferences, in terms of which they deliberate ex ante, on which they 
decide in midstream, and on which they look back with agreement; and 
the lack of optimality content of  the laissez-faire solution even when no 
market failure is present. 
Spontaneous Reactions 
Robert Merton’s excellent public pension plan, though he never knew 
it, is the answer to  an ancient prayer of mine. In public lectures, I used to 
complain that two out of the three features that I wanted in a retirement 
pension were just not available. 
1. Not knowing just when I should die, I wanted an annuity for life. 
This, my friendly Prudential agent had long been glad to sell me. (But still 
I had the impression that, at least until recently, because of moral hazard 
and lack of  popularity, the actuarial loadings and terms of  annuity con- 
tracts were not all that feasible for the ordinary person outside the field of 
education.) 
2.  Not knowing what the future price level would do, I wanted a real 
annuity for life. This was just  not available; however, in  1952, when 
TIAA  set up CREF  and when we were all still under the innocent illusion 
that a portfolio of  common stocks provided a good hedge against infla- 
tion, it looked as if  it was possible to begin to meet this second require- 
ment. 
3. Noticing that the average real level of consumption was rising in the 
modern mixed economies, and realizing that my unhappiness increases 
when I see myself moving down the scale of real income and consumption 
relative to the people of  all  ages  I  live with,  my  final unreasonable 
demand was for an annuity that would  leave me for life at the same 
percentile  level  of  the working  age population’s  real  living as 1 had 
become accustomed to. 
There was  no way  I  could  get  these three wishes.  And indeed, I 
suspected that if  somebody invented that better mousetrap and beat a 
path to my door, I would not be able to afford the cost of that mousetrap 
and would have to scale down my hankerings. 
At this point, I did what we ail do when we have an itch that we’re not 
able to  scratch out of our own resources. I thought of  the government. It 
knows we are all going to die, and when on the average that will happen. 
So it can reduce variance to zero in working out actuarial annuity terms 
by merely operating on a pay-as-you-go basis. (So help me, it was Aaron 
Director, in my first University of Chicago elementary economics course 
in 1932, who said: “Everyone is going to die; be born; quit work at an 
average age lower than the average age of  death. Why have insurance 
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when the government can simply and cheaply provide for everyone by 
law and mandatory taxes what we all are going to need?” I have forgotten 
many things Director taught me, but not those words of pre-Beveridge 
wisdom.) I do  not know whether government can control inflation. But it 
can tax the nominal fruits of inflation. So it can offer us a real annuity. 
At this point, the embryo of  my  1958 pure consumption model of 
overlapping generation was kicking in the womb. Government, I real- 
ized, has a tax hold on the fruits of Hicks-neutral technical change and 
every other kind of technical change. So when I am old, it can tap the 
enriched harvests produced by my contemporary  juniors and let me share 
in what science and technology have brought to the system even without 
my having stinted myself in my prime years out of prudential forethought 
for the future. 
By  this time I  was shameless. With  the numerosity of  my  own six 
children, future taxpayers all, before my eyes, I realized that government 
could build into the real annuity account that was implicitly accruing on 
my  behalf  the biological interest rate equal to the steady-state rate of 
population growth. 
One more goody you may think might have occurred to me. Adam and 
Eve, the very first generation born into an already going concern, Eden, 
had an opportunity  no later generation could enjoy. Adam and Eve could 
bite into the apple. Doing this enjoyable thing had to be made a sin so that 
such  an irreversible  act  wouldn’t  again  occur.  You  may  think  I  am 
referring to the possibility that my generation, not being able to take it 
with us, proposed to use it up (it  being the capital stock built up since the 
industrial revolution) in our single retirement years. I have nothing so 
crass and simple in mind as eating up the apple or  the milling lathes. What 
I have in mind is something for nothing! 
The first generation of social security requirements can get a free ride 
in an overlapping generation system with a positive Harrod natural rate 
of growth of  population and of neutral technical change. That (almost!) 
free ride is often the political factor that sells the idea of social security to 
the democracy. So it happened in FDR’s America and in Scandinavia in 
the late 1950s. 
However, there is only one free ride. And along with the free ride of 
the initial generation, who reap what they never had to pay anything 
for-namely,  social security-there  exists the one final gouging of  the 
terminal generation. Particularly when the population growth rate has 
turned negative and when younger workers begin to ask, “What have our 
parents done for us lately?” the voters may disavow the promised benefits 
that everyone had been able to count on. 
By now you will realize that Merton deduced by a stochastic optimal- 
control maximum that I was right to want my three-pronged pension. 
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provided for ourselves in each generation by US INCORPORATED- 
the government-or,  in the absence of  externalities, moral hazard, and 
market failure for informational and transaction-cost reasons, a perfect 
competitive market of  like situated  persons can recreate for each of them 
what omniscient benevolent government can create for all of them. 
Lingering Questions 
Because Merton has put down a concrete plan, we can use it to bring 
out major issues that a post-1982 social security system must face. Here 
are a few nonsystematic questions that his plan made me think about. 
1. Our tax  system  keeps track of  our respective  incomes, not our 
consumptions. If  not impossible, it would still, I suspect, be difficult for us 
to go over to a consumption tax system-particularly  if it is to be gradu- 
ated. After we have seen an expenditure tax system, Merton’s consump- 
tion tax for pension purposes will be just one more aspect of it (and, as  he 
points out, a part that is more self-enforcing than the rest). But I have to 
wonder whether, before we have such a general system, it will be admin- 
istratively feasible for so limited an objective. I hope he or someone will 
work out how much distortion there will be  if surrogates (such as income) 
are used for his consumption targets. 
2.  As an academic exercise, one can and should separate social secur- 
ity from “redistribution.” However, it is a central feature of the welfare 
state that democracies want to perform much of  their redistributions by 
means of their life-cycle taxes and benefits. The equality that matters is 
lifetime equality. Social security, properly, tempts egalitarians to use it. 
3. There is the further point that redistribution between generations 
(overlapping  and  disjoint)  is  the very  essence of  any social  security 
discussion.  Samuelson-Diamond-Merton  models  do  not  deduce  as 
theorems that the laissez-faire solution is the optimal one. Although 
Merton’s exposition puts stress on the case of fully funded public pension 
schemes, the reader must not think that there is something right about 
fully funded public pension systems. The bargain that full-funding over- 
lapping generation models arrive at between me and my posterity or 
forebears is  only  one such  bargain,  albeit one which  is likely to be 
politically honored. (I elaborate on the nonoptimality of  full funding and 
laissez-faire later.) 
4. Having lived in the world before and after social security, I believe 
that myopia is an essential ingredient present in the private and voting 
behavior  equations of  the people we are talking about. Much  that a 
steady-state public system accomplishes could have been contrived pri- 
vately. But it wasn’t. And the voters are at least partially aware of their 
own imperfections. Models that ignore this miss an important point of the 
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Merit Want Aspects of  Social Insurance 
In the following amplifications of  my Amelia Island oral remarks, I 
begin with the central feature of the New Deal social security genesis, of 
which  Robert Merton  and all the speakers  at this National  Bureau 
conference have taken little notice. Democracies introduce upon them- 
selves social security precisely because the voters realize that they are 
prone to act in too myopic a way in their private spontaneous  capacities as 
consumers and savers. 
Americans in the century before 1937  were the richest people on earth. 
But still it was the case that most  people died broke and lived their 
declining years as charges on their children and on the meager resources 
of  private and public philanthropy. Of  course, people had the capability 
to consume less in their working years and consume more at the older 
ages. But in fact the extent to which the majority did so was judged by 
that majority to be deficient. 
We have here a clear case of  what  Richard Musgrave  (1959) calls 
“merit wants.”  Democracies vote universal conscription in time of  war 
even though (and precisely because) any one  person may not volunteer in 
a regimen where it cannot be assured that others will volunteer. Democ- 
racies regulate availability of therapeutic and other drugs, distrusting the 
revealed preferences  and indifference curves of  their own citizenry. And 
often this is not a matter of some ruling elite or bureaucracy telling the 
consumer herd what is or is not good for them; but, rather, it is a case 
where most of us do not wish to entrust to our day-to-day impulses the 
supply-and-demand deployment of these economic items. 
The road to Hell is admittedly paved with good intentions. Likewise 
the descent to tyranny is festooned with rationalizations for merit-want 
interferences with personal economic liberties. So always the burden of 
proof has to be against the overruling of  each of our indifference curve 
preferences. Only when the case is made in a strong way are merit wants 
to be promulgated in the good society. 
Where life-cycle rationality is concerned, a prima facie case for merit 
wants has always been recognized. Precisely where judgments are con- 
cerned about the future, particularly the far future, each of  us realizes 
that we do  not possess consistent ex ante and ex post preferences. We are 
prone to sow wild oats we later come to regret. Faced with the fact that 
most cigarette smokers acquired as teen-agers the dishygienic habit they 
wish they could get rid of, only a crackpot libertarian could regard as 
ethically optimal all behavior patterns that arise under voluntarism. 
Maurice  Allais  (1943),  Robert Strotz (1956), A. C. Pigou  (1944), 
Oskar Lange (1936-371, and a host of philosophers have elucidated the 
problem of human myopia where the passage of time is concerned. Even 
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respect to intertemporal trade-offs were evolved during eons when the 
caveman’s opportunity  sets  and life expectancies were very different from 
what they are in modern economic life, militates against the notion that 
there is something sacrosanct in the representative person’s indifference 
curves between different time-of-life consumptions. 
I must  emphasize that the point  to which I am calling attention is 
something deeper than the “externalities” point, according to which we 
introduce compulsion to make sure you save for your old age-because 
otherwise  you  would  be tempted to save too little under the correct 
knowledge that the rest of us will be so uncomfortable at the sight of your 
poverty that we shall be effectively blackmailed  into supporting you. 
Even if  there were no such sympathy or envy, if  each of us was prone 
before the 1937 birth of  social security to consume more in our working 
years than on reflection we conceive to be (“ethically”) desirable, we 
could rationally mandate on ourselves a social security system. And even 
if it were fully funded, there is no realism to the notion that people will in 
fact  undo rates of  positive  saving by  acts of  private borrowing  or of 
equivalently reducing the tax-enforced reduction in consumption during 
the working years. It is precisely because of the existence of  myopia-or 
discrepancy  between  what one thinks about ex ante and what  one’s 
judgments are ex post-that  the general  run  of  the citizenry  escape 
realization that they have the power to undo privately what they have 
voted governmentally on themselves. 
It will be no refutation of the fundamental  logical and factual point I am 
making if  now, almost half a century after the New Deal debates about 
social security  began,  the de facto existence  of  a social  security  and 
widespread corporate pension system should have reduced substantially 
the irrational element of myopia in the citizenry’s overt preference struc- 
ture, Use develops a muscle. Once each of  us lives in an environment 
where virtually all of us engage in explicit life-cycle savings-voluntary 
and mandatory-our consciousness is raised. Like the forms into which 
cement for a cathedral  is poured, which have done their duty even though 
they can later be  dispensed with, the social security system must  be 
credited with contributing toward the restructuring of American minds in 
the direction of much more explicit rationality in making life-cycle con- 
sumption saving decisions. 
How Unfull Should Funding Be? 
There is  much reason to believe  that the  1937 inception of  social 
security would never have been politically achievable if there had to be an 
insistence on full funding of the new social insurance scheme. The elec- 
torate persuaded itself  to create social security only because  the first 
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them at the system’s inception in  1937, could  be  given  benefits their 
in-payments never earned at a perceived burden that could appear to be 
light for many years ahead. 
Most legislators and journalists never understood the real financing of 
social security. But one who did understand it-for  example, Marion 
Crawford  Samuelson,  whose  job as a research  assistant  on Seymour 
Harris’s project at Harvard was to study the economics of  social secur- 
ity-could  rationally favor the underfunding of  the system on the well- 
founded grounds that any engineered  increments of  public thriftiness 
would in the Great Depression days of mass unemployment and near- 
zero marginal rates of interest merely have increased the unemployment 
rates in the 1937-41 prewar period. When markets do not clear in the 
fashion presupposed by naive neoclassicism or supersophisticated mod- 
ern rational expectationism, an increase in thriftiness can in fact reduce 
achieved  capital  formation  and  ex  post  total  saving.  If  Franklin 
Roosevelt’s right hand had taxed to make the social security system fully 
funded, in all probability his left hand would have been forced by the 
resulting  increment  of  unemployment  to engage in  offsetting  deficit 
spending so as to abort the purpose of full funding. During World War I1 
itself, private consumption was indeed restrained by rationing and en- 
forced unavailability of durable goods, but the exigencies of  war did not 
allow increments of  capital formation to occur in the interests of later 
generations of  retirees. 
Once the postwar achievement of conditions near to full employment 
had been achieved, undoubtedly an increase in social security tax rates 
could have been used to increase the total of  United States  capital. Easier 
Federal Reserve monetary policy would then be implied to offset any 
deflationary effects of the fiscal surpluses. However, if it were deemed 
good public policy to promote capital formation-whether  to prepare for 
a surge of retirees later or for whatever reason-quite  without regard to 
the social security accounts there remained the opportunity for the gov- 
ernment to engineer a general budgetary surplus: an increase in public 
saving, other things  being  equal, could  by  means of  accommodating 
monetary ease contrive a lower ratio of consumption to capital formation 
at full employment levels.2 
Democratic Resolution of Thrift Decisions 
So far I have been taking for granted that our unfunded social security 
system does not conduce to the optimum mix of United States capital 
formation and current consuming. But, as I have already stated, eco- 
nomic theory does not conclude that the social optimum is achieved by 
full funding, On the contrary, even if  intralifetime myopia or market 
imperfections were ignorable, and people were all alike, it would still not 
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saving decisions or-what  is then the same thing-to  full-funded social 
security the task of determining how much capital formation there is to  be 
in the steady state and in the transient approach to it. 
To appreciate that there is nothing optimal about laissez-faire saving 
decisions, consider the recent discovery of  oil in North Sea Norwegian 
waters. None of  the political parties is content to leave it up to the current 
generation of  Norwegian savers to determine how fast this exhaustible 
resource should be used up in the interests of  Norwegians now alive as 
against the interests of Norwegians still to come. Both conservatives and 
social democrats would reject the shibboleth proposed by Milton Fried- 
man for disposition  of  Alaskan windfall oil assets, namely, that each 
present-day Alaskan be given sellable securities that signify each person’s 
pro rata shares. If  Alaskan  Eskimos and Caucasians wish to go on a 
glorious binge, then Friedman would argue that this should be allowed to 
happen. Or, if  they wish to bequeath some of  their windfall to later 
generations, then in whatever degree they choose to do so, that is ips0 
facto the correct outcome. Nothing in economic science or in the calculus 
of  freedom for the individuals who will exist in the stream of  history 
sanctifies such a solution-except  the shibboleth that laissez-faire is right 
whatever are its consequences. 
I am not suggesting that some Plato ought to dictate to the Norwegian 
people how successive generations  shall relatively fare, doing so through 
decisions  being  made about social security  rates and oil  exploitation 
rates. My point is that the Norwegian electorate have the right to second 
guess by legislation what they believe will occur if  they leave the decision 
to laissez-faire Walrasianism. 
My concluding section draws on the analytical studies of  steady-state 
equilibria  in  overlapping-generation  models.  Such Modigliani-Turgot 
models-or,  what is the same thing, Samuelson-Diamond-Merton mod- 
els-generate  equilibria which have no necessary proximity to golden 
rule states.’ They provide no economic justification for the present fad 
glorifying full funding of  social security, leaving that proposal only with 
the defense that full funding is the only mode of operation which can be 
terminated or expanded without losses or profits. 
Paradoxes of  Exponential Growth 
1. The faster a population’s (permanent) exponential growth rate, the 
more workers there will be to support each older retiree (Samuelson 
1958). However, the greater the population growth, the more will be the 
subtractions  from per capita  production  that must  be withheld  from 
consumption in order to keep capital widening in step with labor-supply 
growth (Diamond 1965; Samuelson 197.5~~  1976). The two-part golden 
rule requires that, in a population growing forever at the percentage rate 
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person will be at its maximum only if  capital’s net product equals the 
biological  interest rate of  R  and if  people’s intralifetime consumption 
decisions are made taking into account that same R opportunity cost of 
successive periods’ consumptions (Samuelson 1968). Warning: All tech- 
nical change is ignored here; production  is considered to obey a one- 
sector  neoclassical  production  function  A  la  Solow  (1956);  bequest 
motivations are ruled  out. Meade-Lerner total  utility considerations, 
which  are not addressed  here, also do not sanctify laissez faire’s full 
funding. 
2.  Laissez-faire life-cycle saving and fully funded social security will 
lead, under certain rather artificial  but  often  invoked conditions,  to 
precisely the one  and the same equilibrium-as  private industries cease to 
save privately exactly the amount that the mandatory public social secur- 
ity system saves on their behalf (Samuelson 1975b, theorem 2). 
3. The resulting equilibrium will, in general, deviate forever from the 
two-step golden rule optimum (Samuelson 19756, p. 540). However, by 
appropriately gauged nonfunded social security, society can be swung 
into the two-step golden rule configuration (Samuelson 1975a, theorem 
4.  In the singular case where the rate of population growth is the most 
golden of  all rates-in  the sense of  yielding maximum lifetime utility 
forever of  the representative  person of  each generation-fully  funded 
social security (which is the same as no social security at all!) would by the 
Serendipity  Theorem  achieve  the  two-step  golden  rule  (Samuelson 
19766, fig. 16). 
5. There are some realistic reasons why the most golden population 
growth  rate  might  involve  negative  growth  rates  (Deardorff  1976; 
Samuelson 1976). To the degree that this is so, the present era of incipient 
population decline may perhaps be near the optimum. And then, redis- 
tribution  and myopia aside, the case may be stronger today for fuller 
funding than it was when the social security system was adopted in 1937. 
6. To the degree that the present income tax system leads to too little 
capital formation (and to deadweight loss), more than full funding of 
Merton’s social security might be desirable. People are forced to pay in 
more than they will ever perceive themselves to be getting back in their 
old age. As the public debt is reduced by the overall government surplus, 
the Federal Reserve’s optimal interest rate policy is one low enough to 
keep employment full with a high ratio of investment to income. 
1). 
*** 
Finally, I should call attention to the writings of  Meade (1956), Das- 
gupta (1969), and Gigliotti  (1983a,  1983b). These are in  the ancient 
Sidgwick-Edgeworth  utilitarian  tradition  that wishes to maximize  the 
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by A.  P. Lerner (1957) and Asimakopulos (1967) in discussion of Samuel- 
son (1958, 1959). The “most golden state” by this utilitarian criterion is 
not realized by laissez faire’s full funding-as  the Norwegian oil case well 
shows. 
Notes 
1. The fact that the intrinsic rate of population growth has dropped since 1960  is the only 
genuine new factor that creates a problem for the U.S. social security program. All things 
considered, steady population decline probably expands society’s capacity to afford gener- 
ous retirement  benefits to its elderly. (A partial offset to the implied fall in  the ratio of 
workers to retirees is the drop in the ratio of dependent minors to workers. The decline in 
the net reproduction rate is itself in good part a consequence of the increased propensity of 
women to be in the taxable labor market, which is  another favorable offset. Finally,  a 
declining  population  requires  less  widening of  capital,  thereby  releasing  more for the 
consumption of each person of any age. See Samuelson (1975a, 19761 for discussion of these 
crosscurrents.)  But  even  if  the  population  decline is on  balance a favorable factor,  it 
admittedly exacerbates the element of  deadweight loss involved in financing those benefits 
by  high taxes on the working ages. 
2. I have always found it odd that a Martin Feldstein, who registered concern that social 
security  displaces  private  saving  by  being  unfunded  and thereby  undermining  capital 
formation, should at the same time play down in policy discussions the Tobin-Samuelson 
proposals for fiscal surpluses-cum-central  bank ease. Feldstein’s legitimate concern over 
the wedge between before-tax and after-tax returns for capital by no legitimate syllogism of 
logic can serve to rationalize that inconsistency. The fact that chocolate is good does not 
negate the fact that honey is good. 
3.  Such equilibria  are admittedly Pareto intertemporally  optimal.  But so too are an 
infinity of other contrived equilibria. And there is no reason to infer that one Pareto-optimal 
point is ethically better than all non-Pareto-optimum  points. 
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